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THE AXIS AND ALLIED MARITIME OPERATIONS AROUND SOUTHERN AFRICA 1939 1945 - WAR ON SOUTHERN AFRICA SEA

21)THE JAPS OFF MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL


3.2 The Japanese submarine offensive in the Mozambique Channel

In December 1941 VAdm Kurt Fricke, the Chief of Staff of the SKL, met with VAdm N. Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin. The successful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December, which heralded Japan’s entry into the war, meant that both the German and Japanese navies were eager to establish and delineate their respective operational areas around the globe. Influence in the Indian Ocean, however, held a particular appeal for both.


The Japanese authorities initially suggested that the operational boundary should be fixed at the 70° East line of longitude, though the Germans preferred a diagonal boundary line stretching from the Gulf of Aden to the northern coast of Australia. The German authorities correctly gauged that the Japanese insistence on the 70° East line of longitude was mainly connected with its territorial ambitions in Asia and the western Indian Ocean. The German proposal would have excluded Australia and Madagascar from the Japanese sphere of influence.[1] By 18 January 1942, however, Germany, Italy and Japan agreed that the 70° East line of longitude would delineate the respective operational areas. The added provision was that naval operations in the Indian Ocean may be carried out beyond the agreed boundary by all Axis forces when operational situations required it. However vague the agreement seemed at the time, it brought the promise of greater cooperation in the maritime sphere between the Axis navies, especially regarding offensive operations in the Indian Ocean and ipso facto South African waters.[2]


On 10 February, Nomura met with Adm Otto Groos. Groos was Chief of SpecialStaff for War Economics and Economic Combat Measures in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht[3] (OKW) and the Chairman of the Military Commission of the Three Power Pact. Issues relating to direct cooperation between the Axis powers in the war were laid on the table. At the meeting, Nomura argued that rather than becoming too heavily committed in Russia, Germany should unite its efforts with Japan in trying to knock Britain out of the war altogether. The Japanese hoped that the Germans would launch an offensive in the Middle East. Such an assault would create favourable conditions for a Japanese offensive in the western parts of the Indian Ocean. Nomura argued that the Middle East was the only area where military cooperation between Japan and Germany was feasible. If the Germans were not eager, Japan might very well lose interest in military collaboration in this geographical area altogether.[4]


At a meeting held on 13 February, Raeder discussed the rapid Japanese advance in Burma and Indonesia and the predicted capture of Ceylon with Hitler. The Germans realised that the Japanese offensives would have devastating effects on British seapower and shipping in the Indian Ocean, as well as on oil supplies originating in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, the Allies would be forced to adopt heavily escorted merchant convoys, which would be more prone to submarine attack. An attack on key British positions around Suez could furthermore have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war, partly because the only graving docks to remain operative for the repair of the major Allied warships would be at the harbours of Durban and Simon’s Town.[5] Later on in March, Raeder informed Hitler of the Japanese intentions to attack Madagascar after its planned capture of Ceylon. Raeder relayed that the Japanese wished to establish bases in Madagascar. From here, they could attack shipping in the Arabian Sea as well as the Indian Ocean seaboard stretching as far south as the Cape of Good Hope. For this plan to succeed, however, they needed German approval because it would have a unequivocal effect on Vichy France and its African colonies, as well as Portuguese East Africa. Notwithstanding, Hitler doubted that Vichy France would consent to the establishment of Japanese bases in Madagascar.[6]


Towards the end of March Nomura and Fricke met once more. During the encounter, Fricke explicitly pronounced his wish that the Japanese should start operations against Allied shipping in the northern Indian Ocean. Fricke argued that the most important Allied sea routes traversed this area. The routes to India would strengthen the India/Burma front, those to Iran would stand in support of the Russian front and the oilfields, and those to the Red Sea and Egypt were crucial for the North African theatre. Nomura agreed to these wishes despite his uncertainty pertaining to the Japanese Supreme Command’s strategic and operational intentions concerning this area. In addition, Fricke requested warning of any possible offensive operations in the Indian Ocean, especially those planned against Ceylon, the Seychelles and Madagascar.[7]


At a further meeting held on 8 April, Nomura made an announcement. He disclosed that the Japanese naval authorities had decided to launch offensive operations off the African coast. The attacks would take place between the Arabian Sea and the Cape of Good Hope between June and July 1942. The main purpose of these operations would be to destroy British and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean by a group of up to five submarines and two armed merchant cruisers. While Fricke welcomed the news, he remained sceptical of the true intentions of the Japanese operations in this area. His concern stemmed from Nomura’s failure to provide any information on the timing of the attacks against Ceylon and Madagascar. Nomura did, however, once more, stress the importance of combined actions against the British in the Indian Ocean, and hoped for simultaneous German offensive pressure coming from a western direction. If this reinforcement was not forthcoming, Nomura deemed Japanese offensive pressure from the east futile. The Japanese wished for the desired operations to start as soon as possible. Fricke urged Nomura that their naval operations should begin at once, and without regard for the German operations. Time was, after all, needed for the British communications to be severed and for the resultant effects to materialise.323


On 14 April, Eugene Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, informed the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, of a probe directed at the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo. Ott had enquired as to whether the Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean were mere harassing measures, or part of a more general strategic plan. Togo intimated that the Japanese were indeed intent on harassing the British. He added that the provocation had a more general meaning “… [they] would also affect the western part of the Indian Ocean, so that Japanese conduct of the war would correspond with the German desire for a Japanese advance in the Indian Ocean in the direction of the Near East.”324 The German Ambassador was further able to confirm from a number of authoritative sources that the main interest of the Japanese High Command remained with the conquest of Burma, Ceylon and the Indian Ocean.325


By the beginning of April, the Japanese High Command decided that the time had arrived to honour their promise and to send naval forces to operate off the east coast of Africa. The Japanese, unlike their German and Italian counterparts, did not favour attacking merchant shipping alone. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) admitted that its forces were ill-suited for a protracted naval war, and that the early annihilation of the Allied fleets was thus paramount.[8] As opposed to their German counterpart, the Japanese Submarine Fleet did not have a large number of ‘general purpose’ submarines. It entered the war with a limited submarine fleet of sixty vessels. Of these, forty-seven were of the I-class ‘fleet submarines’, which were developed to give the greatest strategic and tactical support to the capital ships of the IJN. The I-class submarines were known for their very high surface speeds, large fuel capacity, and their ability to carry either a midget submarine or small reconnaissance aircraft. All told, the I-class submarines displaced around 2000 tons, which adversely affected their manoeuvrability, diving and depth-keeping. This displacement prompted the Japanese High Command to restrict its deployment of submarines to operations which would have a definite impact on shortening the war.[9] With respect to the overall strategy of the IJN during the war, the limited naval operations of its submarines against merchant shipping in the Mozambique Channel during mid-1942 should thus be seen as an isolated undertaking to appease an ever-demanding German ally.


Admiral Nomura and Chief of Staff SKL, 27 Mar 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Notes on main point of discussion Nomura-Fricke, 27 Mar 1942.

  1. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between C/SKL and Japanese Naval Liaison Staff, 8 Apr 1942.
  2. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Telegraphic report German Ambassador Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister, 14 Apr 1942. 325  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 1

The possibility of a Japanese occupation of Madagascar prompted the British defence planners to take action against the Vichy-controlled island in 1942. If the Japanese took over Madagascar, they would have ready access to the strategic harbour of Diego Suarez – situated roughly halfway along the strategic sea route between Colombo and Cape Town. This would have a detrimental effect on Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean as Japanese naval forces would then have a free hand to attack shipping along the entire east coast of Africa.[10] In a letter to Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill stated that “A Japanese air, submarine, and/or cruiser base at Diego Suarez would paralyse our whole convoy route both to the Middle and Far East…”[11] Smuts also considered Madagascar to be key to safety in the Indian Ocean especially regarding merchant shipping. He felt that a strategic decision about Madagascar’s occupation was required sooner rather than later. He further stated that the occupation of Diego Suarez would alone not deter possible Japanese aggression against Madagascar. In his opinion, the entire island, including the ports of Majunga and Tamatave, needed to be taken over. Churchill subsequently decided to carry out the occupation of Madagascar. Force 121, under the command of Maj Gen Robert Sturges, successfully seized Diego Suarez on 7 May 1942. The occupation of Madagascar, however, took much longer, with the Vichy French forces only surrendering on 4 November after an armistice was signed.330


The Japanese defence planners detached the 1st Division of the 8th Submarine Flotilla, then based at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands and under the command of Capt N. Ishizaki, for the intended operation in the Mozambique Channel. The 1st Division consisted of three submarines: I-16 [Lt Cdr Y. Kaoryu]; I-18 [Cdr O. Kiyonori] and I-20 [Cdr Y. Takashi]. A further two submarines – Capt Ishizaki’s flagship I-10 [Cdr K. Yasuchika] and I-30 [Cdr E. Shinobu] – were attached for the operation (see Table 3.4). The accompanying supply ships were the two armed merchant cruisers from the 24th Raider Squadron, the Aikoku Maru [RAdm (ret) O. Masao] and Hōkoku Maru [Capt (ret)A. Aritaka] (see Table 3.5).[12]


Class

Type A1

Type B1

Type C 

Ship

I-10

I-30

1-16, 1-18, 1-20

Displacement

2,919 tons

2,584 tons

2,554 tons

Crew

100

94

101

Speed  (Surface)

23.5 knots 

(43.5 km/h)

23.5 knots 

(43.5 km/h)

23.6 knots 

(43.7 km/h)

Speed (Submerged)

8 knots  (15 km/h)

8 knots  (15 km/h)

8.0 knots  (14.8 km/h)

Surface  Range 

30,000 km @  16 knots

26,000 km @  16 knots

26,000 km @  16 knots

Submerged Range

110 km @ 3 knots

178 km @ 3 knots

110 km @ 3 knots

Armament

6 × bow 533 mm  torpedo tubes

18 × torpedoes

  1. × 140 mm  deck gun
  2. × twin 25 mm Type 96 AA guns

6 × bow 533 mm torpedo tubes

17 × torpedoes

  1. × 140 mm  deck gun
  2. × single 25 mm Type 96 AA guns

8 × 533 mm  Torpedo tubes

20 × torpedoes

  1. × 140 mm   deck gun
  2. × 25mm Type 96 AA guns

Miscellaneous

1 × Yokosuka E14Y seaplane

1 × Yokosuka E14Y seaplane

1 × Type A Ko-Hyotekiclass 

midget submarine

Table 3.4: Statistical data on the Japanese submarines[13]


By late April, the submarines had arrived at Penang.  I-30 was ordered to travel towards Aden, where it arrived on 7 May. After its arrival, its aircraft reconnoitred the harbour. Two days later, the French harbour at Djibouti was also inspected, followed by Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam on 19 May. These reconnaissance forays failed to find any suitable targets, and the remainder of the submarines followed a southerly course from Penang across the Indian Ocean. 

In the wake of the submarines, the Aikoku Maru and Hōkoku Maru captured the Dutch tanker Genota (7,897 tons) to the south-southeast of the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. On 20 May, I-10 launched its aircraft which reconnoitred Durban harbour and parts of the Natal coast. No protective measures were taken by the South African Air Force (SAAF) or the anti-aircraft defences situated around Durban. Despite a large number of merchantmen lying in the open roadstead of Durban – and the arrival of the battleship HMS Resolution – no attack on local merchant shipping followed. This was mainly due to the Japanese wishing to conceal their presence, as Ishizaki’s main aim remained the destruction of Allied warships.333


Class

Hōkoku Maru-class Ocean Liner

Ship

Aikoku Maru

Hōkoku Maru

Displacement

10,437 tons

10,438 tons

Surface Speed

20.9 knots (38.7 km/h)

21.1 knots (39.1 km/h)

Crew

133 men

150 men

Armament

8 × 140 mm L/50 deck guns

4 × 25 mm Type 96  AA guns

4 × 533 mm torpedo tubes

8 × 150 mm L/40 deck guns

2 × 76.2 mm L/40 AA guns

4 × 533 mm torpedo tubes

Miscellaneous

2 × Kawanishi E7K Floatplanes

2 × Kawanishi E7K Floatplanes

Table 3.5: Statistical data on the Japanese armed merchant cruisers334


By the end of May, the submarines had arrived off the coast of northern Madagascar. An aircraft from I-10 investigated the anchorage of Diego Suarez on 29 May. Upon its return, the aircraft reported that the following vessels were at anchor in the bay: a British battleship, HMS Ramillies, as well as two destroyers, two corvettes, a troopship, a hospital ship, a tanker, a merchantman and ammunition ship. Ishizaki, acutely aware of the prize pickings, ordered I-16, I-18 and I-20 to launch their midget submarines and attack the unsuspecting ships in the Diego Suarez harbour the following night. During the night of 30 May only the midget submarine from I-20, commanded by Lt A. Saburo, managed to infiltrate the harbour. It successfully attacked and damaged HMS Ramillies and shortly thereafter sunk the tanker British Loyalty (6,993 tons). Despite precautionary depth charges dropped by the British corvettes thereafter, the midget submarine remained undetected throughout the attack. The British Loyalty was later refloated and sunk elsewhere, while HMS Ramillies travelled to Durban for repairs. Shortly after this daring incursion, Saburo was forced to ground his midget submarine on the outer reef at Diego Suarez. On 2 June, Saburo and his crewmate were engaged by a party of Royal Marine Commandos after being spotted by locals the day before. Both men were killed during the attack. A further midget submarine launched from I-16 that night was declared missing in action soon afterwards.[14]


http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_b1.htm,http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_c1.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/ships/type%20a. These webpages were accessed over the period 24-27 April 2017.

  1. Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 136-137; Hashimoto, Sunk, p. 24.
  2. Statistical data collated from the website Imperial Japanese Navy Page, especially the pages dealing with the Aikoku Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Aikoku_t.htm) and the Hōkoku Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Hokoku_c.htm). These webpages were accessed over the period 24-27 April 2017.

Following the relatively successful attack on Diego Suarez, Ishizaki divided his submarines into two groupings to attack merchant shipping at both ends of the Mozambique Channel. The first merchant vessel, the Elysia (6,757 tons), was lost on 5 June through the combined efforts of the Aikoku Maru and Hōkoku Maru. A further three merchantmen, the Atlantic Gulf (2,639 tons), Melvin H. Baker (4,998 tons) and the Johnstown (5,086 tons) were sunk by the submarines on the same day. This brought the total tonnage sunk for the day to nearly 20,000 tons.[15] Following these attacks, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Eastern Fleet and South Atlantic Station, ordered all merchant shipping in the Mozambique Channel – as well as those sailing north from Durban – to hug the coastline. It was hoped that the nominal protection of the air and surface forces of the Eastern Fleet would further deter Japanese attacks on merchant shipping. The fleet was based at Kilindini in Kenya and controlled all merchant shipping between Durban and the equator. The Eastern Fleet was in a rather precarious position, however, as it had only three corvettes and five destroyers with which to counter the Japanese submarines in the Mozambique Channel. SAAF A/S patrols, on the other hand, only extended as far north as Delagoa Bay. This reaffirmed that the Mozambique Channel was a definite chink in the armour of the Allied defences.[16]


A further nine merchant vessels were sunk in the Mozambique Channel during the following week. They were the Susak (3,889 tons), Wilford (2,158 tons), Christos Markettos (5,209 tons), Agios Georgios IV (4,847 tons), King Lud (5,224 tons), Mahronda (7,926 tons), Hellenic Trader (2,052 tons), Clifton Hall (5,063 tons) and the Supetar (3,748 tons).[17] The sinkings prompted the Deputy C-in-C of the Eastern Fleet, RAdm Victor Danckwerts, to redirect troop convoys and fast unescorted merchantmen to take the alternative route along the east coast of Madagascar. At the same time, a number of warships were ordered to patrol off the two exits of the Mozambique Channel.[18] At this point, Ishizaki’s submarines withdrew from the area and rendezvoused with the Aikoku Maru and Hōkoku Maru on 17 June to refit and resupply. In the meanwhile, I-30, which did not take part in the above mentioned attacks, was ordered to France, where she arrived at Lorient on 2 August.[19]


The Japanese submarines resumed their operations in the Mozambique Channel towards the end of June. This coincided with a renewed report of an unidentified aircraft spotted over Durban. Though I-10 was operational off the Natal coastline at this stage, the aircraft incident remains mere speculation. In the following week, a further ten merchent vessels were sunk. Among them were the Queen Victoria (4,937 tons), Goviken (4,854 tons), Steaua Romana (5,311), Express (6,736 tons), Alchiba (4,427 tons), De Weert (1,805 tons), Eknaren (5,243 tons), Mundra (7,341 tons), Nymphe (4,504 tons) and the Hartismere (5,498 tons). By the second week of July, the Japanese submarines had left their operational area in the Mozambique Channel and had returned to their bases at Penang by the beginning of August. 


 

 

#

Date Attacked On/By

Ship

Tonnage

Country

Lat/Long

1

5 Jun 1942 (Aikoku Maru)

Elysia

6,757

Brit.

 27⁰ 33'S; 37⁰ 05'E

2

5 Jun 1942 (I-10)

Atlantic Gulf

2,639

Pan.

 21⁰ 03'S; 37⁰ 36'E

3

5 Jun 1942 (I-10)

Melvin H. Baker

4,998

Amer.

 21⁰ 44'S; 36⁰ 38'E

4

5 Jun 1942 (I-20)

Johnstown

5,086

Pan.

 13⁰ 12'S; 42⁰ 06'E

5

6 Jun 1942 (I-16)

Susak

3,889

Yugoslav

 15⁰ 42'S; 40⁰ 58'E

6

6 Jun 1942 (I-18)

Wilford 

2,158

Norw.

 20⁰ 20'S; 36⁰ 47'E

7

8 Jun 1942 (I-20)

Christos Markettos

5,209

Greek

 05⁰ 05'S; 40⁰ 53'E

8

8 Jun 1942 (I-16)

Agios Georgios IV

4,847

Greek

 16⁰ 12'S; 41⁰ 00'E

9

8 Jun 1942 (I-10)

King Lud

5,224

Brit.

 20⁰ S; 40⁰ E 

10

11 Jun 1942 (I-20)

Mahronda

7,926

Brit.

 14⁰ 37'S; 40⁰ 58'E

11

11 Jun 1942 (I-20)

Hellenic Trader

2,052

Pan.

 14⁰ 40'S; 40⁰ 53'E

12

12 Jun 1942 (I-20)

Clifton Hall

5,063

Brit.

 16⁰ 25'S; 40⁰ 10'E

13

12 June 1942 (I-16)

Supetar

3,748

Yugoslav

 21⁰ 49'S; 35⁰ 50'E

14

28 June 1942 (I-10)

Queen Victoria

4,937

Brit.

 21⁰ 15'S; 40⁰ 30'E

15

29 June 1942 (I-20) 

Goviken

4,854

Norw.

 13⁰ 25'S; 41⁰ 13'E

16

30 June 1942 (I-20)

Steaua Romana

5,311

Brit.

 09⁰S; 42⁰E

17

30 June 1942 (I-10)

Express

6,736

Amer.

 23⁰ 30'S; 37⁰ 30'E

18

1 July 1942 (I-10)

Alchiba

4,427

Dutch

 25⁰ 25'S; 34⁰ 49'E

19

1 July 1942 (I-18)

De Weert

1,805

Dutch

 25⁰ 12'S; 35⁰ 36'E

20

1 July 1942 (I-16)

Eknaren

5,243

Swed.

17⁰S; 40⁰E

21

6 July 1942 (I-18)

Mundra

7,341

Brit.

 28⁰ 45'S; 32⁰ 20'E

22

6 July 1942 (I-10)

Nymphe

4,504

Greek

 15⁰ 48'S; 40⁰ 42'E

23

8 July 1942 (I-10)

Hartismere

5,498

Brit.

 18⁰ 00'S; 01⁰ 22'E

 

Total Merchants Sunk

23

       
 

Total Tonnage Lost

110,252 tons

 

Table 3.6: Merchantmen lost in the Mozambique Channel, Jun-Jul 1942[20]


The Japanese submarine offensive in the Mozambique Channel had been highly successful (see Table 3.6). For the loss of only two midget submarines, Ishizaki’s force was able to cripple a British battleship and sink more than 100,000 tons of merchant shipping in the space of two months. The Japanese operation once more highlighted the vulnerability of the remote British lines of communication through the Mozambique Channel, which for the most part was protected by a few Allied air patrols and A/S vessels.[21]


Map 3.2: Shipping lost to the Japanese submarine offensive, 1942


By August, the promise of greater cooperation between the German and Japanese navies severely diminished, as Nomura informed Col Gen Alfred Jodl, the Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, that the IJN would no longer partake in remote operations. The Japanese withdrawel was partly the result of the arrival of the monsoon season, a dire need for an overhaul of some ships, as well as a direct increase in its operational losses throughout 1942.[22] For the remainder of the war, the Japanese submarines did not undertake any further planned offensive operations in the western Indian Ocean and in particular the Mozambique Channel and South African waters.

All told, the limited Japanese submarine offensive was simply a means to an end for the German High Command. The promise of greater Japanese-German naval cooperation in the western Indian Ocean was conclusively all but theoretical.[23] Instead, by convincing the Japanese to launch a submarine offensive in the Indian Ocean in mid1942, the Germans had in fact created a definite diversionary effect that worked in their favour. The Allied attention was now split between the campaigns in North Africa and Madagascar, and the protection of shipping off the West African and American seaboards. The result was that an attack on merchant shipping off the coast of Cape Town would not be expected.


[1] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents –

German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting Chief SKLNomura, 17 Dec 1941; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured

German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. GermanJapanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. 1/SKL Appreciation of Situation, 18 Dec 1941; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes Chief of Staff SKL to Chairman Military Commission of Tripartite Pact, 19 Dec 1941.

[2] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Copy of Military Agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan, 18 Jan 1942; Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 115.

[3] Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The OKW had nominal oversight over the Army, Navy and Air Force. 

[4] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Report on discussion with Admiral Nomura from Chair Military Commission Tripartite Pact to Chief OKW, 17 Feb 1942; Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 115.

[5] Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 363-364; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 312, File: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1942, Report to the Fuehrer, made by the Commander-in-Chief, Navy the afternoon of 13 Feb 1942.

[6] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 312, File: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1942, Report by the Commander-in-Chief Navy to the Fuehrer at Headquarters ”Wolfsschanze” the evening of 12 Mar 1942. Also see Thomas, ‘Imperial backwater or strategic outpost?’, pp. 1049-1074.

[7] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between

[8] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between C/SKL and Japanese Naval Liaison Staff, 8 Apr 1942.

[9] Batchelor and Batchelor, The Complete Encyclopedia of Submarines 1578-2006, pp. 258-263; DOD

Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – GermanJapanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. 1/SKL Appreciation of Situation, 18 Dec 1941.

[10] Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, p. 202.

[11] Churchill, The Second World War , Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate, pp. 197-198. 330          Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 131-135, 142-143.

[12] Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 135-136; Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, p. 77; Hashimoto, Sunk: The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet, 1942-1945, pp. 24, 38. Note that these sources only gave a very general description of the 1st

Division, 8th Submarine Flotilla, Imperial Japanese Navy and its operation against the harbour of Diego Suarez, Madagascar. Further data was gathered from the Imperial Japanese Navy Page website (http://www.combinedfleet.com/). The detailed statistics, including the tabular movement of individual armed merchant cruisers and submarines, were particularly helpful. The links to the individual pages dealing with each of the submarines and armed merchant cruiser are listed below, and they were accessed between 24-27 April 2017. (http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-18.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-10.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/Hokoku_t.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-20.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/Aikoku_t.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-16.htm and http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-30.htm.

[13] Batchelor and Batchelor, The Complete Encyclopedia of Submarines, pp. 258-263; Statistical data collated from the website Imperial Japanese Navy Page, especially the pages dealing with the different classes of Japanese submarines (http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_a1.htm,

[14] Wessels, ‘Die stryd teen Nippon’. pp. 222-241; Wessels, ‘South Africa and the War against Japan’ (http://www.samilitaryhistory.org/vol103aw.html); Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 137.

[15] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy action in South African waters.

[16] Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 138-139.

[17] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy action in South African waters.

[18] Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 137-140.

[19] Statistical data collated from the website Imperial Japanese Navy Page, especially the pages dealing with the Aikoku Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Aikoku_t.htm), the Hōkoku Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Hokoku_c.htm) and I-30 (http://www.combinedfleet.com/I30.htm). These webpages were accessed over the period 24-27 April 2017.

[20] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy action in South African waters.

[21] Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 140-143; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy action in South African waters.

[22] DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between Jodl, Nomura, Bansai at Fuehrer HQ, 8 Aug 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting Chief SKL-Nomura, 11 Aug 1942.

[23] Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 363-364.


 

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