On March 15, in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's despatch, the South Atlantic Force became the Fourth Fleet. At the time this change in designation came the Admiral was aboard the Memphis, returning from a long ocean sweep. His itinerary had included a four day stopover in Montevideo for the purpose of attending the inauguration of the Uruguayan President, which occurred early in March.
The Fleet at the time of its inception included both United States and Brazilian Units. The former numbered the Cincinnati, Marblehead, Memphis, Milwaukee, and Omaha, Cruisers; the Davis, Moffett, Winslow, Barry, Borie, Goff, Jouett, and Somers, Destroyers; the Carnelian, a District Craft Yacht; the Patrol Vessels Courage, Saucy, Siren, Surprise, and Tenacity; the Minesweepers Flicker and Linnet; the Seaplane Tender Humboldt; the Auxiliary Oiler Patoka; the Supply Ship Melville; 15 PCs; one Floating Drydock. still in Mobile; two Motor Mine Sweepers; a Yard Oiler; and a Harbor Tug. There were the floating units. To them must be added the three plane squadrons based at Natal, and the two remaining Provisional Marine Companies; the 18th at Natal and the 19th at Recife.
Brazilian units available at this time included 15 ships, plus the Força Aerea Brasileira. However, the composition of the Fleet at a given time often had little permanence. Throughout its history ships came and departed with great frequency. It has not been deemed best to enumerate the changes fully here, since to itemize them all would be both tedious and without general interest.
A matter worth noting for March is the preliminary step taken toward the establishment of Navy Lighter-than-Air craft in Brazil. The Admiral broached the subject on the first of the month, when he recommended to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that Blimp Bases be extended southward from Dutch Guiana to include sites at Salinas, São Luiz, Natal, and Fernando de Noronha. At the end of the month, a committee detailed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations arrived in Recife to start on its tour of inspection for recommending Lighter-than-Air sites. At the end of the first week in April, the members submitted their report, to be forwarded by the Commander Fourth Fleet to higher authorities. In summary, they recommended a main base at Maceio, with mast facilities for Amapá, Igarape Assu, São Luiz, Fortaleza, Recife, Fernando de Noronha, and Bahia. They also favored facilities at Trinidad in addition to those already under construction there, because the Belem area lacked any suitable location. They made the additional suggestion that partial facilities be provided for each base at the earliest possible date.
Before many months blimps had moved into Brazil, although arrangements made finally as to bases departed somewhat from the original recommendations. Also by March preparation had begun for combating the subs in a scientific way. It will be recalled that during the previous December the Admiral had requested the sending of an Attack Teacher, Sangamo Type, from the United States, and a little later had learned that this would arrive aboard the Melville. On the 5th of February the Melville docked at Recife. Accompanying the Sound Gear were Ensign N. T. Margolis and a Soundman 2/c. They soon set up, in the Administration Building,
the Submarine Signal Attack Teacher Unit. The purpose of this was to teach anti-submarine warfare to all escort craft, through the use of underwater sound gear. M Officers and selected members of ships crews, when in port, visited the unit and became familiar with the new gear. Within a month of his arrival Ensign Margolis had extended his teaching to Brazilian officers and men. The instruction here had to be very rudimentary and was complicated by the language difficulty. To rectify this, Segundo Tenente Carlos Neiva, son of Admiral Neiva, was added to the staff. He had a fluent knowledge of English and acted as Liaison Officer. He also rapidly learned the use of the Attack Teacher, and gradually became a co-worker and instructor.
Ultimately, the Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit was built up to a large organization, numbering six officers and a considerable staff of enlisted men. The tendency, as time passed, was gradually to shift emphasis from the instruction of American to that of Brazilian Navy personnel. But for the time being the Attack Teacher served mostly to prepare American ships for immediate contacts with German subs. March was a busy month, with most of the successes being scored by the U-Boats. The Germans took a heavy toll of the Merchant Ships plying the South Atlantic.
On the first of the month, the steamer Fits John Porter, which was part of a Bahia-Trinidad Convoy escorted by three Brazilian warships, was torpedoed at 12° 20' S, 37° 01' W. None of the escorts obtained sound contacts, so no attack could be delivered. March 3 saw the Brazilian Merchant Ship Marajo nearly hit. She sighted the torpedo and one of her escorts, the Brazilian Rio Grande do Sul, made a sound contact, which, however, was too indefinite to permit the Rio Grande to attack. This occurred in position 13° 25' S, 38° 32' W.
Two days later, on March 5, reports came of three sinkings by enemy underwater craft, though the incidents had been spread rather widely apart in time. The Roger B. Taney, an American ship, had been sunk on February 7, by two torpedoes fired from a submerged submarine. The survivors, who included one officer and 12 men of the Armed Guard crew, spent 21 days in a lifeboat before the British Penrith Castle picked them up and landed them in Bahia, all uninjured. The Sinking took place at Latitude 22° 00' S, Longitude 07° 00 W, much closer to Africa than to Brazil, which accounts for the failure of the South Atlantic Force to learn earlier of the loss.
On the morning of March 3, the Brazilian Merchant Vessel Affonso Pena was torpedoed at 18° 20' S, 37° 30' W, not far from Porto Seguro. Again there were survivors and these landed at Porto Seguro on the 5th, the incident being reported immediately to the Bahia Naval Observer, Lieutenant Commander Saben, by the Brazilian authorities. The third victim was the SS Staghound, torpedoed ad sunk on the morning of March 4, at 16° 10' S, 37° 20' W. Survivors picked up by the Argentine Rio Colorado reached Bahia safely within two days.
The early morning hours of March 9 witnessed the heaviest losses that had yet been suffered at any one time. The Bahia-Trinidad Convoy designated BT-6 was then at no great distance from its destination. The Fitz-John Forter, lost the first day of the month, had also been a member of this convoy. Following the original loss the merchant vessels put in at Recife, where the USS Borie, Ericsson, and Courage, with PCs 488, 575, 577, 592, 593, and 610, plus the Siren and Tenacity and the Motor Mine Sweepers 60 and 76, took over the escort.
At 0215 on the 9th, the Borie reported a submarine attack, and six hours later the same ship sent word that an offensive anti-submarine search had been conducted with negative results. The Borie's recommendation was that air coverage and salvage vessels be provided at once.
The submarines had indeed made a killing. The Kalvinbeck, British, and the James Smith and James K. Polk, both American, had gone down. Other American ships, the Joseph R. Drake, Thomas Ruffin, Mark Hanna, and George Meade, were damaged but afloat. The PC-592 was then standing by in the vicinity with 130 survivors on board.
NOB Trinidad took most of the salvage measures necessary, since the destruction had occurred in its vicinity. HMS Milford, with tugs Zwarte Zee and Frisky, proceeded at once from Trinidad to the position of PC-592. Three Corvettes followed a little later. From Paramaribo, Dutch Guinana, the Army Tug Jessop left to remove the survivors. A Salvage Tug from Moengo also went to the scene for the purpose of retrieving the damaged ships. By these prompt measures the disaster was prevented from assuming the fullest proportions.
The one real success of the month occurred the following day, though even this involved some loss. The German blockade runner Kota Nopan has been mentioned earlier in connection with the Anneliese Essberger. When the latter was scuttled in November, 1942, the Kota Nopan was also believed to be in the South Atlantic. On March 10, she did put in an appearance, even though a brief one.
At that time Admiral Read was at sea, commanding Task Units 23.1.6 and 23.1.7, which together made up Task 23.1. The Kota Kopan was sighted by a plane from the Santee, whereupon the Savannah and Eberle proceeded to intercept her. The contact took place at 07° S, 21° W. The crew of the runner abandoned ship on being discovered, but before doing so took time to initiate incendiaries and demolitions. In the face of grave danger, an Eberle boarding party searched the ship, in the hope of salvage and of obtaining valuable information. Explosions took place while the searchers were on board; one man was killed, seven were missing, and two seriously injured. One of the latter succumbed to his wounds while undergoing treatment in the Savannah. The blockade runner sank soon after the explosions. Prisoners, numbering 70 and including some German Navy personnel, were brought to port in the Savannah, along with effects and captured material.
At the time of her interception the Kota Nopan flew the Dutch flag, and when challenged she gave the call for the Netherlands ship Kota Tjandi. As a matter of fact she was originally Dutch, her previous name having been Kota Penang. At the time of her interception, she was bound for the Japanese held Dutch East Indies, and had a cargo of crude rubber.
March events continued to come thick and fast. On the 15th, the crew of a Pan-Air Clipper sighted a submarine, fully surfaced, in position 05° 04' S, 33° 40' W, on course 065° T., traveling at an estimated speed of 12 knots. The plane was bound for Natal at the time, but sent the report on the sighting ahead. Immediately on landing, the pilot was interviewed by an Aviation Intelligence Officer, whereupon one VP-83 and two VP-74 planes departed to investigate. The first mentioned aircraft sighted a conning tower so close to the location given by the Pan-Air pilot that there could be no question as to the identity. He at once made a run on the sub, which submerged so quickly that he had no chance to drop his bombs. Due to the distance, it had not been possible to observe any identity marks on the enemy.
Other planes from the two squadrons soon came to relieve the original ones. To hold down the sub, they instituted a patrol of an area fifty miles square. Many hours later a VP plane sighted a wake in the moonlight, and then a fully surfaced submarine, no doubt still the same one. A flare was released but failed to light. The plane quickly dropped to an altitude of less than a hundred feet and released four 650 pound depth bombs, spaced thirty feet by the intervalometer. One bomb appeared to detonate on or just below the surface, shaking the plane. Others seemed to be within 25 feet of the sub. Even so, no results could be observed, though it was reasonable to suppose some damage had been committed. This caused a surface vessel, the Somers to be sent to the scene. She had been helping escort a convoy not far away, and was spared temporarily for this new duty. But all her efforts, plus those of additional planes which swept the area for hours, could not contact the sub. One of the planes sighted it briefly, but it was too far away to attack. Not until the morning of the 17th did they give up the hunt.
In the meantime, a plane from the Santee had located another submarine not far away, and attacked it on the surface. With the Eberle, which came to join in the hunt, the Santee scoured the area. The planes found the sub and attacked again, with doubtful results, although a large, fresh oil slick did appear. Nothing justified claiming a kill. Within a few days submarine war on merchant ships had been resumed. The Dutch steamer Mariso was the next victim, being torpedoed and sunk
On March 20 at 13° 20' S, 37° 25' W. The survivors definitely identified their assailant as German. Three members of the crew were lost, the first mate and the wireless officer were imprisoned on board the sub, 28 men in a lifeboat remained unheard from, and the rest reached Bahia safely. The Saucy, while acting as part of the escort of Convoy TB-8, encountered a submarine on March 22. After a sound contact and an attack, the ship had five torpedoes fired at her, but escaped being hit. In all, the Saucy made eleven depth charge attacks and finally lost contact. This occurred in position 00° 20' N, 46° 48' W.
On the 25th, the Swedish merchant vessel Industria, of neutral status was attacked and sunk by a German submarine in 11° 40' S, 35° 55' W. The Industria at the time was proceeding from Philadelphia to Rio. The sub removed the Captain, the Chief Officer, and the Chief Engineer, from a lifeboat and took them aboard. Shortly after this, the St. Cergue, of Swiss registry, picked up 22 survivors and landed them at Bahia. The final sinking of the month came on the 29th, when an unidentified ship, using call sign GW4XN, was torpedoed at 04° 08' N, 17° 33' W. For this month which saw the fleet attain its new dignity, the story had been unfortunate. In spite of all the merchant ships destroyed and the number of attacks made on subs, there was not an instance where a kill could be claimed with certainty.
Hyper War. Commander South Atlantic Force. U.S Naval Administration in WW II.